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Introduction
Over the last three years, the 
Health Care Fraud Prevention and 
Enforcement Action Team (“HEAT”) 
has recovered over $10.2 billion in 
healthcare fraud settlements, many 
involving pharmaceutical companies 
charged with the “off-label promotion”1 
of drugs to healthcare providers.2 As an 
effort to change corporate culture, each 
of these settlements has included a cor-
porate integrity agreement (“CIA”) 
with the Office of Inspector General 
(“OIG”) for the Department of Health 
and Human Services (“HHS”). The 
deterrent effect of CIAs, however, is 
uncertain,3 and even the OIG has 
acknowledged that billion dollar settle-
ments are not a sufficient deterrent to 
change corporate culture in pharma-
ceutical companies.4 Moreover, some 
companies view paying these fines as 
merely the “cost of doing business.”5
One reason for the lack of deter-
rence may be that pharmaceutical 
companies believe they are “too big”6 
to be excluded by the OIG because of 
the risk it would pose to the welfare of 
government healthcare beneficiaries.7 
Another reason may be due to the fail-
ure of the laws governing “directors’ 
exercise of their fiduciary duties to 
impel boards to pursue their company’s 
strict adherence to the law”8 and fully 
embrace “compliance as good busi-
ness.” While some alternatives have 
been offered,9 the OIG has responded 
by indicating its intent to exclude 
corporate executives in the life sciences 
industry from federal healthcare pro-
grams “under a broader range of 
circumstances,”10 including the Respon-
sible Corporate Officer (“RCO”) 
doctrine.11 For example, HHS Deputy 
Inspector General Gerald T. Roy testi-
fied to Congress that the OIG would 
operate “with a presumption in favor 
of exclusion” when there is “evidence 
that an executive knew or should have 
known of the underlying criminal 
misconduct of the organization.”12 By 
excluding corporate officers, the 
OIG believes it can better “influence 
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corporate behavior without putting 
patient access to care at risk” and “alter 
the cost-benefit calculus of the corporate 
executives who run these companies.”13 
Holding true to its promise, the 
OIG excluded three former Purdue 
Frederick Company (“Purdue”) exec-
utives in 2007 for their misdemeanor 
misbranding convictions under the 
RCO doctrine. On July 27, 2012, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit upheld their 
exclusions in Friedman v. Sebelius 
because the executives’ misdemeanor 
convictions were factually related to 
fraud. The Court remanded the case 
back to the District Court regarding 
the 12-year exclusion length because 
the OIG failed to explain why the 
penalty was three times longer than 
penalties imposed in comparable 
cases in the past14 and four times lon-
ger than the presumptive baseline in 
the statute.15 The D.C. Circuit Court 
denied a petition for rehearing en 
banc by the executives on Nov. 29, 
2012.16 The Court mandated the case 
back to the District Court, which 
remanded the case to the OIG on 
December 12, 2012.17
Consequently,  lawyers  and 
healthcare stakeholders must closely 
examine this decision because the 
OIG may “expand its use of [permis-
sive] exclusion against individuals”18 
and the decision may encourage more 
RCO prosecutions. As a result, these 
exclusions may have the unintended 
consequence of deterring “talented, 
qualified, and ethical individuals from 
working in senior or leadership posi-
tions”19 in the life sciences industry 
for fear of being excluded when they 
engaged in no wrongful conduct. 
Case Background
In May 2007, Purdue pled guilty 
to felony misbranding, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 331(a) and § 333(a)(2) 
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”), because some of Purdue’s 
employees made misrepresentations 
to healthcare providers that the pain-
killer OxyContin was less addictive, 
less subject to abuse and diversion, 
and less likely to cause tolerance and 
withdrawal than other pain medica-
tions.20 Purdue was placed on probation 
for five years, fined $500,000, and sub-
jected to other monetary sanctions 
totaling approximately $600 million, of 
which approximately $160 million was 
earmarked for restitution to federal and 
state healthcare agencies.21 At the same 
time, the three executives22 each pled 
guilty to a single count of misdemeanor 
misbranding as “responsible corporate 
officers,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(a) and § 333(a)(1), for their 
admitted failure to prevent Purdue’s 
fraudulent marketing of OxyContin. 
The RCO Doctrine
The RCO doctrine has its roots 
in two Supreme Court cases: U.S. v. 
Dotterweich23 and U.S. v. Park.24 In 
Dotterweich, prosecutors obtained a 
misdemeanor conviction of the gen-
eral manager of a store that sold 
repackaged drugs when, without his 
knowledge or involvement, a ship-
ment was made to a physician that 
contained less potent drugs than indi-
cated on the label. In a 5-4 decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction, finding that the general 
manager bore “a responsible share in 
the furtherance of the transaction 
which the statute outlaws.”25 The 
Court declined to explain the mean-
ing of “responsible share.”26
The Supreme Court elaborated 
on the Dotterweich holding in Park, 
where the president and chief execu-
tive officer (“CEO”) of a national 
grocery chain with 900 stores was 
charged with a misdemeanor for sell-
ing adulterated food. Although Park 
claimed that he was not “personally 
concerned” with the violations,27 the 
government presented testimony that 
“[the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”)] informed him, by letter, of 
unsanitary conditions in the store’s 
Baltimore warehouse.”28 The Supreme 
Court instructed that:
 the government establishes a 
prima facie case when it intro-
duces evidence sufficient to 
warrant a finding by the trier of 
the facts that the defendant had, 
by reason of his position in the 
corporation responsibility and 
authority either to prevent in the 
first instance, or promptly to cor-
rect, the violation complained of, 
and that he failed to do so.29 
As a result, the Court held that a 
“corporate agent, through whose act, 
default, or omission the corporation 
committed a crime” in violation of the 
FDCA may be held criminally liable 
for the wrongdoing of the corporation 
or lower-level corporate employees, 
“whether or not the crime required 
‘consciousness of wrongdoing’” by the 
agent.30 In other words, criminal liabil-
ity for an FDCA violation does not 
require “awareness of some wrongdo-
ing” or “conscious fraud.”31 
In addition, criminal liability 
under the RCO doctrine extends “not 
only to those corporate agents who 
themselves committed the criminal 
act, but also to those who by virtue of 
their managerial positions or other 
similar relation to the actor could be 
deemed responsible for its commis-
sion.”32 A corporate officer may 
therefore be guilty of misdemeanor 
misbranding without “knowledge of, or 
personal participation in,” the underly-
ing fraudulent conduct.33 Thus, the 
word “responsible” in the doctrine’s 
name does not mean that the individ-
ual is responsible for the misconduct, 
but…for the corporation.”34 As a 
result, the Court in Park imposed the 
“highest standard of care” on corporate 
executives, thereby permitting convic-
tion of such “responsible corporate 
officials who, in light of this standard 
of care, have the power to prevent or 
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correct violations of its provisions.”35 
The Court recognized that this high 
standard imposed on responsible cor-
porate agents was “no more stringent 
than the public has a right to expect of 
those who voluntarily assume positions 
of authority in business enterprises 
whose services and products affect the 
health and well-being of the public 
that supports them.”36
The Court in Park did create a 
defense that corporate officers are 
not expected to prevent or remedy 
wrongdoing by doing the “objectively 
impossible.”37 As the Washington 
Legal Foundation38 noted in its Fried-
man amicus brief, however, “[t]his 
defense is surely more useful to mid-
level executives than to senior level 
executives.”39 Even if the most “thor-
ough and assiduous supervision 
produced no evidence of a problem, it 
would always be objectively possible for 
a CEO, who has authority over a com-
pany, to have prevented wrongdoing.”40
After Park, the RCO doctrine was 
“infrequently relied upon, and when it 
was invoked, it was typically in cases 
where the individual either partici-
pated in or knew of the wrongful 
conduct.”41 In fact, the government’s 
brief in Park acknowledged that the 
FDA would not “ordinarily recom-
mend prosecution unless that official, 
after becoming aware of possible viola-
tions…has failed to correct them or to 
change his managerial system so as to 
prevent further violations.”42 In addi-
tion, FDA officials did not use the 
doctrine because the agency was 
focused on felony cases.43 
In 2010, however, FDA Com-
missioner Margaret Hamburg, PhD, 
sent a letter to Senator Charles 
Grassley (R-IA) explaining that the 
agency had decided to “increase the 
appropriate use of misdemeanor 
prosecutions [as] a valuable enforce-
ment tool to hold responsible 
officials accountable.”44 The FDA 
subsequently updated its Regulatory 
Procedures Manual to add a new 
section on Park Doctrine prosecu-
tions.45 In addition, former FDA 
Deputy Chief for Litigation Eric Blum-
berg noted that FDA would target 
“pharmaceutical executives whose 
companies promoted off-label uses of 
their products” for misdemeanor prose-
cutions and urged federal prosecutors 
to “show[] more resolve to criminally 
charge individuals at all levels in the 
company.46 The Washington Legal 
Foundation responded to Blumberg 
with a letter, calling his comments 
“irresponsible” and urging the FDA 
not to pursue Park prosecutions where 
“the individual in question did not 
participate in or have knowledge of 
the alleged violations.”47
In Friedman, the D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that because the executives, 
as part of their plea agreements, 
admitted having “responsibility and 
authority either to prevent in the first 
instance or to promptly correct” the 
misbranding, the executives admitted 
being guilty of misdemeanor mis-
branding under the RCO doctrine.48 
However, both the presiding judge 
who accepted the corporate and exec-
utive plea agreements and the 
prosecuting U.S. Attorney recognized 
the absence of any proof that the 
executives had any personal knowl-
edge of the misbranding or any 
personal intent to defraud.49
Consequently,  the Distr ict 
Court’s holding established an unfa-
miliar precedent under the RCO 
doctrine. Previously, the Supreme 
Court only recognized narrow excep-
tions for the mens rea requirement in 
the case of misdemeanor charges 
under the FDCA’s RCO doctrine 
because the penalties were “rela-
tively small”50 and conviction did no 
“grave damage” to the person’s reputa-
tion.51 The executives in Friedman, 
however, had to disgorge approximately 
$34.5 million52 in compensation and 
faced what amounted to a lifetime ban 
from the pharmaceutical industry.53 It 
is practically impossible for an 
excluded individual to be employed in 
the healthcare industry, since most 
pharmaceutical companies rely on reve-
nue from federal healthcare programs.
The OIG’s Exclusion  
Authority and Relation to 
Corporate Executives
Four months after the executives 
were sentenced, the OIG informed 
them of its intent to exclude them 
from participating in any federal 
healthcare program for 20 years, pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1). 
Exclusions, often referred to in the 
industry as the “economic death pen-
alty,” are “remedial in nature, not 
punitive.”54 They are a payment-
related sanction, and if excluded, the 
government may not make any pay-
ment for any items or services billed to 
a federal healthcare program by the 
excluded individual or entity. The 
OIG has mandatory and permissive 
exclusion authority. Under the manda-
tory authority, the OIG must exclude 
any individual from participation in 
any federal healthcare program who is 
convicted of: (1) a program-related 
crime;55 (2) an offense relating to 
patient abuse;56 (3) a felony relating to 
healthcare fraud;57 or (4) a felony 
relating to controlled substances.58
Under the OIG’s permissive exclu-
sion authority, the agency may exclude 
an individual “based on a host of lesser 
offenses and even affiliations with sanc-
tioned entities.”59 In the Friedman case, 
the OIG pursued permissive exclusion 
under Section (b)(1), which allows the 
OIG to exclude an individual con-
victed of a “misdemeanor relating to 
fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of 
fiduciary responsibility, or other finan-
cial misconduct.”60 The OIG may also 
permissively exclude any individual 
“who has a direct or indirect ownership 
or control interest in a sanctioned 
entity61 and who knows or should know 
of the action constituting the basis for 
the [sanction]; or who is an officer or 
managing employee of such an entity.”62 
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Although the OIG has relied upon this 
paragraph only approximately 30 times 
since 1996, mostly against individuals 
who controlled small businesses,63 the 
OIG issued guidance64 in October 2010 
on its permissive exclusion authority 
under Section 1320a-7(b)(15), “which 
encourages greater consideration and use 
of this power”65 to exclude executives. 
The OIG released the guidance while 
the Purdue executives’ case was pending.
The guidance explains that the 
OIG will exercise a presumption in 
favor of exclusion under section (b)
(15) where there is evidence that an 
owner, officer, or managing employee66 
knew or should have known of the 
conduct leading to the exclusion or 
conviction of the entity, unless “sig-
nificant factors” weigh against 
exclusion. In the absence of such evi-
dence, the “OIG will apply the 
enumerated nonbinding factors in 
determining whether to exclude an 
officer or managing employee.”67 
First, the OIG will consider the “cir-
cumstances of the misconduct and 
seriousness of the offense,” which 
includes (a) the nature and scope of the 
misconduct and any related misconduct; 
(b) the level within the entity at which 
the misconduct occurred;68 (c) the 
nature and scope of criminal and civil 
sanctions imposed on the entity; (d) 
whether the misconduct resulted in 
actual or potential harm to beneficiaries 
or financial harm to any persons or pro-
grams; and (e) whether the misconduct 
was an isolated incident or part of larger 
pattern of wrongdoing. Second, the OIG 
will consider the “individual’s role in the 
sanctioned entity,” including the indi-
vidual’s current and former position(s) in 
the company; the degree of managerial 
authority or control exercised by the 
individual; and whether the misconduct 
occurred within the individual’s chain 
of command.69
Third, the OIG will consider the 
“individual’s action in response to the 
misconduct.”70 This includes whether 
the individual acted to stop the under-
lying misconduct or mitigate the 
effects of the misconduct; whether the 
individual’s actions to stop or mitigate 
the misconduct occurred before or 
after the individual learned of the gov-
ernment’s investigation; and whether 
the individual disclosed the miscon-
duct to the appropriate authorities and 
cooperated with investigators and 
prosecutors. If the individual can dem-
onstrate either that preventing the 
misconduct was impossible or that the 
individual exercised extraordinary care 
but still could not prevent the con-
duct, the OIG may consider this as a 
factor weighing against exclusion. 
Finally, the OIG will consider “infor-
mation about the entity,” including 
any previous sanctions or convictions 
by any federal or state government; 
and the size and corporate structure of 
the company.71 Despite these criteria, 
the OIG may still exclude officers and 
managing employees “based solely on 
their position within the entity.”72
The FDA’s updated Regulatory 
Procedures Manual outlined the use 
of similar criteria. For example, the 
Manual provides that when consider-
ing prosecution against a corporate 
official, the FDA should consider “the 
individual’s position in the company 
and relationship to the violation, and 
whether the official had the authority 
to correct or prevent the violation.”73 
The FDA clarified that “[k]nowledge 
of and actual participation in the 
violation are not a prerequisite to a 
misdemeanor prosecution but are fac-
tors that may be relevant.”74 The 
Manual also added a non-exhaustive 
list of other considerations, many 
relating to the nature of the viola-
t ion . 75 Consequent ly,  f ede ra l 
healthcare enforcement authorities 
have used the OIG’s permissive exclu-
sion guidance and the FDA’s recently 
updated Manual to prosecute several 
corporate officers in the last few years.
Examples of the OIG’s 
Exclusion Efforts Against  
Corporate Executives 
Shortly after issuing its guid-
ance, the OIG expressed its intent 
to expand the application of section 
(b)(15) to exclude executives of large 
complex organizations such as a drug or 
device manufacturer. One reason for 
the OIG’s decision to expand (b)(15)’s 
application to executives was because 
the agency was “concerned about 
criminal conduct” and maintained 
that its remedy in civil cases – CIAs – 
was “not sufficient to protect programs 
going forward and provide a deterrent.”76 
Demonstrating its intent, the 
OIG first used (b)(15) to exclude 
Marc Hermelin,77 former Chairman 
of the Board and Chief Executive 
Officer of KV Pharmaceutical Co., on 
November 18, 2010.78 On December 
7, 2010, Gregory Demske, Assistant 
Inspector General, characterized this 
exclusion as a “preview of things to 
come.”79 
Interestingly, Hermelin was not 
charged or convicted at the time of his 
exclusion. Instead, the OIG pursued 
his exclusion because Hermelin “was 
identified in the information in the 
criminal conviction;” there was evi-
dence that he “was involved in what 
the company pled guilty to;” and there 
was evidence that Hermelin had made 
certain determinations about what to 
report and what not to report to the 
FDA.”80 Hermelin eventually pled 
guilty in March 2011 to two counts of 
misdemeanor misbranding as a 
responsible corporate officer, was sen-
tenced to 30 days in jail, and ordered 
to pay $1.9 million in fines and forfei-
tures.81 Like the Purdue executives, 
however, the government did not 
charge Hermelin with personal knowl-
edge or intent.82 KV itself could have 
faced mandatory exclusion as well for 
being controlled and owned in major-
ity by Hermelin; however, the OIG did 
not seek exclusion of KV once Herme-
lin divested himself.83
The OIG also proposed excluding 
Howard Solomon84 of Forest Phar-
maceuticals85 under Section (b)(15). 
Unlike the executives in the Friedman 
case who had admitted to misde-
meanor criminal conduct pursuant to 
the RCO doctrine, Solomon had not 
admitted to any criminal intent or 
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failures and was never charged. Thus, 
the OIG’s proposed exclusion was 
based solely on Solomon’s position as a 
“responsible corporate officer” and that 
he was “associated with” Forest.86 The 
Wall Street Journal reported that the 
attempt was “raising alarms in that 
industry and beyond about a potential 
expansion of federal involvement in 
the business world.”87 The OIG, how-
ever, dropped the exclusion action 
against Solomon without any explana-
tion.88 Interestingly, the OIG also 
contemplated excluding seven other 
top executives of Forest and informed 
the company of this possibility in 
September 2010.89 
The OIG also has not yet pursued 
the exclusion of Gary Osborn, owner 
of Apothécure Inc., a compounding 
pharmacy.90 Osborn pleaded guilty 
under the RCO doctrine to two counts 
of misbranding and was sentenced to 
one year of probation, which included 
90 days of home detention, and a 
$100,000 fine.91 The criminal conduct 
involved the death of three patients in 
2007 who died because of a colchi-
cine92 overdose, which Apothécure 
compounded. Osborn admitted that 
as owner, he was “responsible for the 
procedures and equipment” and for 
ensuring that drugs were compounded 
properly. However, neither the crimi-
nal information nor agreed-upon facts 
presented to the court mention that 
“Osborn was aware of any discrepan-
cies with respect to the manufacture” 
of the drug or aware “of specific issues 
related to inadequate procedures or 
deficient equipment in the intravenous 
lab (IV lab).”93 The OIG did exclude 
Michael Dinkel, owner and president 
of Drew Medical, Inc., a diagnostic 
imaging services provider in Orlando, 
Florida, for improper billing and 
false claims.94 Interestingly, the OIG 
excluded Dinkel under section 
1320-a7(b)(7) without a criminal 
conviction95 and “[p]rior to the civil 
settlement, OIG notified Dinkel that 
OIG intended to exclude him.”96
Additionally, the OIG imposed a 
five-year exclusion on the former CEO 
of InterMune, W. Scott Harkonen, 
M.D., in August 2011, after he was 
sentenced for wire fraud for the cre-
ation and dissemination of a press 
release to the public that contained 
false and misleading information about 
the efficacy of Actimmune (Interferon 
gamma-1b) as a treatment for idio-
pathic pulmonary fibrosis (“IPF”).97 
Although the clinical trial had failed, 
InterMune’s press release falsely stated 
that the results of the clinical trial 
established that Actimmune helped 
IPF patients live longer.98 
Harkonen was convicted in a Sep-
tember 2009 trial and sentenced in 
April 2011 to three years probation, six 
months of home confinement, a 
$20,000 fine, and 200 hours of commu-
nity service. Federal prosecutors, 
however, had urged ten years’ impris-
onment and a $1 million fine, 
maintaining in their sentencing mem-
orandum that “executive suites and 
board rooms of drug companies across 
the U.S.” would recognize a “substantial 
sentence,” which would “deter current 
and future officers of drug companies.”99 
Consequently, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
upheld Harkonen’s conviction for wire 
fraud, rejecting his argument that the 
press release “expressed a scientific 
view” that is protected by the First 
Amendment.100 Harkonen’s attorneys 
indicated that he will seek en banc 
review of his case.101 
As a result of the conviction, 
Harkonen’s exclusion was mandatory 
under section 1128(a)(3) because he 
was convicted of a felony “related to 
fraud…in connection with the deliv-
ery of a health care item or service.”102 
Harkonen, however, challenged his 
exclusion to the HHS Departmental 
Appeals Board (“DAB”), arguing that 
his wire fraud conviction did not 
have a connection to delivery of a 
healthcare item or service. Specifi-
cally, Harkonen argued that the OIG 
could not show that the statements in 
the press release “affected a single 
physician’s decision to prescribe 
Actimmune.”103 He maintained that 
the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
erroneously found a connection by 
relying on a “purely hypothetical 
‘potential impact’”104 and speculating 
that the charged statements could have 
caused a physician to prescribe Actim-
mune, despite the lack of evidence that 
any physicians wrote prescriptions 
based on the statements.105 Harkonen 
explained how the “potential impact” 
could only materialize if “multiple con-
tingencies occurred,” the possibility of 
which was “highly speculative.”106
Harkonen further argued that the 
ALJ’s factual findings of a potential or 
intended impact on delivery lacked evi-
dentiary support because (1) the jury 
acquitted him of the misbranding 
charge; (2) the district court found 
that the government had failed to 
prove that the wire fraud offense 
caused or was intended to cause a phy-
sician to write a single prescription of 
Actimmune; and (3) the ALJ miscon-
strued the press release.107 Accordingly, 
Harkonen asserted that because the 
statements did not have any impact on 
patients or insurers,108 the requisite 
connection to delivery of healthcare 
services or items was missing, and 
therefore exclusion was improper.109 
Harkonen also asserted that his exclu-
sion violates the Fifth Amendment’s 
Double Jeopardy Clause110 and the 
Eighth Amendment’s protections 
against cruel and unusual punishment.
The OIG responded that because 
such statements were made “in an 
attempt to increase the sale” of 
Actimmune and in fact resulted in a 
“dramatic increase in sales” the year 
the press release was issued, the state-
ments for which Harkonen was 
convicted of had a connection with 
the delivery of a healthcare item or 
service.111 The OIG maintained that 
the “exclusion statute does not 
require a direct connection between 
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the conviction and the delivery of a 
specific health care item or service, 
but instead requires a ‘nexus’ or ‘com-
mon sense analysis’ of whether the 
offense had a connection with the 
delivery of a health care item or ser-
vice.”112 Accordingly, the OIG 
asserted that because the press release 
“was intended to encourage physi-
cians to prescribe, and patients to 
take, Actimmune,”113 such a nexus 
existed. The OIG argued that the 
DAB interprets the phrase “in con-
nection with” to have the same 
meaning as “related to” and construes 
both terms broadly, relying on the 
D.C. Circuit’s broad interpretation of 
such terms in Friedman.114 Specifically, 
the OIG argued that such broad con-
struction “does not require that the 
offense result in a delivery and there-
fore does not require an actual 
delivery of an item or service.115 
The DAB rejected Harkonen’s 
arguments and sustained his exclu-
sion.116 The DAB maintained that 
“the conduct underlying the criminal 
offense does not necessarily have to 
involve [the] actual delivery…of a 
health care item or service to the 
patient or beneficiary” for the OIG to 
exclude an individual under section 
1128(a)(3).117 The DAB reasoned 
that while “financial misconduct gen-
erally is not part of the actual delivery 
of the item or service…it is related to 
payment for…an item or service…
that was intended to be delivered.”118 
Further, the regulations interpret-
ing section 1128(a)(3) recognize that 
exclusion is proper “even if the indi-
vidual’s offense does not involve his/
her personally delivering an item 
or service as an element of the 
offense.”119 Thus, as long as the fraud 
is “linked in a rational way to the 
delivery of a health care item or ser-
vice,” that offense falls under the 
exclusion statute.120 The DAB also 
concluded that the exclusion did not 
violate the “Double Jeopardy Clause 
or the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment” because exclu-
sions are “remedial in nature” and 
necessary to “protect federal health 
care programs and their beneficiaries 
from individuals who have been 
shown to be untrustworthy.”121 The 
DAB upheld his exclusion because 
the evidence showed that Harkonen 
was “untrustworthy in representations 
he made or caused to be made” about 
Actimmune.122 Harkonen has filed 
suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California seek-
ing to overturn the exclusion.123 
Moreover, the OIG excluded 
four former Synthes, Inc. executives 
under section (b)(1) on October 18, 
2012. The exclusions came almost a 
year after the four executives were 
sentenced to prison124 for their mis-
demeanor pleas as “responsible 
corporate officers” for introducing 
two misbranded devices – Norian XR 
and Norian SRS, bone cement prod-
ucts – into interstate commerce.125 
The company and the executives 
pled guilty in 2009. The government 
alleged that the four Synthes execu-
tives conducted “unauthorized clinical 
trials of two bone cements for an unap-
proved use, marketed the products 
without first conducting clinical trials 
required by FDA, continued to market 
the products until three patients died 
during surgeries in which the products 
were used, and did not recall the prod-
ucts from the market because such an 
action would have required them to 
notify the FDA.”126 
The government introduced 
evidence of the executives’ “false,” 
“ fraudulent,”  “deceptive,”  and 
“intentionally deceiving” conduct, 
convincing the judge that there was 
an “unparalleled” “pattern of decep-
tion.”127 The court characterized the 
scale of the executives’ deception as 
“extreme” and recognized that “[n]o 
similar set of facts [could] be located in 
the universe of Park doctrine cases,”128 
which in turn contributed to his sen-
tencing three of the defendants to 
prison terms above the federal sen-
tencing guidelines.129 Thus, unlike the 
Purdue executives and unlike the 
“standard Park-doctrine behavior, in 
which an unaware corporate official is 
held strictly liable for the conduct of 
his subordinates,” the conduct here 
involved the “direct, knowing, intelli-
gent and intentional choices” made 
by the executives.130
Two other incidents involving 
potential FDCA violations are also 
worth examining because of the 
potential implications they may have 
on future prosecutions of corporate 
executives. First, in 2010 the govern-
ment indicted Lauren C. Stevens, 
former associate general counsel for 
GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) on several 
counts regarding her involvement in 
various interactions and exchanges 
with the FDA regarding drugs the 
agency was investigating for off-label 
promotion.131 Stevens raised an 
advice of counsel defense132 and while 
her investigation was pending, sought 
disclosure of “grand jury transcripts to 
determine whether the government 
properly instructed the grand jury” on 
this defense.133 Although this indict-
ment was dismissed, the government 
indicted her again on the same 
charges shortly after.134 
At trial, the judge acquitted her, 
asserting that the case “should never 
have been prosecuted” and that it 
raised “serious implications for the prac-
tice of law.”135 Importantly for in-house 
and outside counsel of pharmaceutical 
companies, the court recognized the 
“enormous potential for abuse in allow-
ing prosecution of an attorney for the 
giving of legal advice.”136 As a result, 
the decision called “into question the 
wisdom, in a complex regulatory set-
ting, of using non-administrative tools 
– and particularly criminal process – 
to secure individual compliance.”137 
The second incident, in 2012, 
involved the government’s failed 
prosecution of Stryker Biotech Corpo-
ration and several of the company’s 
national sales directors and regional 
managers for off-label promotion and 
concealment of adverse events.138 The 
government alleged that Stryker had 
deliberately misled surgeons and put 
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patients at risk through off-label promo-
tion, and claimed to have evidence that 
the individuals knew doctors were 
being misled.139 Despite strong claims 
from the government, defense counsel 
for Stryker revealed that federal prose-
cutors “had failed to speak with any of 
the surgeons…or victims.”140 Instead, 
defense counsel spoke with the sur-
geons who were willing to testify that 
no fraud or deceit had occurred; in fact, 
the first witness testified that “doctors 
mixed the two products in question, 
because that is consistent with medical 
practice, not because they had been 
influenced by Stryker Biotech sales 
reps.”141 As a result, the government 
dismissed all charges against the indi-
viduals, including Mark Philip, who 
was president from 2004 to 2008, and 
settled the case against the company 
with a single misdemeanor count of 
misbranding a medical device.142 U.S. 
Attorney Carmen Ortiz explained that 
“doing justice meant dismissing the 
charges, rather than subjecting these 
individuals to a protracted trial where 
the government could not put its 
most effective case before the jury.”143
On the Horizon:  
The OIG’s Next Steps
Pharmaceutical executives may 
face even greater risk of exclusion in 
the future, particularly because the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has 
expressed increased interest in pursu-
ing “individuals responsible for illegal 
conduct just as vigorously” as the 
agency pursues corporations.144 In 
fact, Nathaniel Yeager, Health Care 
Fraud Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in Boston, “said that he was in 
regular dialogue with HHS OIG on…
issues of exclusion.”145 Initially, the 
OIG excluded Hermelin before he 
was convicted due to evidence tying 
him to the illegal conduct KV pled 
guilty to. The OIG next excluded the 
Purdue executives after they accepted 
misdemeanor pleas under the RCO 
doctrine for misbranding under the 
FDCA. The OIG most recently 
excluded the Syntheses executives 
after their convictions under the 
RCO doctrine. 
The “next logical step” beyond 
KV and Forest, according to current 
Chief Counsel to the Inspector Gen-
eral Gregory Demske, is to “exclude 
someone based on the fact [that] they 
had been in a position of responsi-
bility at a corporation when a crime 
occurred, without…admission [that] 
the individual was involved.”146 The 
OIG essentially attempted this 
approach with Forest and Solomon, 
but the facts of that case may not have 
been strong enough to pursue under 
Demske’s new proposal, which may 
explain why the agency backed down. 
Nevertheless, Demske indicated 
that the OIG was presently consider-
ing cases to determine when excluding 
an executive would be appropriate, 
and said the agency would use its 
permissive exclusion guidance147 in 
determining whether to proceed. 
Moreover, in its Top Management 
Concerns, the OIG asserted that it 
would consider “cases in which 
excluding responsible corporate offi-
cers of sanctioned providers and 
suppliers is appropriate” and will moni-
tor “the effect of such an exclusion on 
recidivism.”148 The OIG, however, said 
it would not go back in time to previ-
ously settled cases and would only 
pursue this option with “respect to 
companies that were on notice before 
they entered a plea or settlement.”149 
Despite the potentially increased risk 
to executives of exclusion, the OIG 
likely will face difficulty bringing such 
actions without new exclusion author-
ity because sanctioned entities 
typically have a new CEO and execu-
tive suite by the time the entity settles 
with a criminal conviction. 
Specifically, the OIG can “only 
pursue [exclusion of] a person who is in 
office of a convicted entity.”150 The 
agency cannot “reach the former 
CEO”151 because under section 1320 
a-7(b)(15), the OIG may only permis-
sively exclude an individual “who has a 
direct or indirect ownership or control 
interest in a sanctioned entity…or who 
is an officer or managing employee of 
such an entity.”152 Thus, the OIG can-
not permissively exclude a corporate 
executive or officer under section (b)
(15) who no longer has a direct or 
indirect ownership or control interest 
in the sanctioned entity or is no longer 
an officer or manager of the sanctioned 
entity. As a result, the universe of 
potential executives subject to exclu-
sion is limited, despite Senator 
Grassley’s attempt to expand the 
OIG’s permissive exclusion authority 
to individuals with past ownership or 
control interests in sanctioned enti-
ties or who were past officers or 
managing employees.153 The court in 
Friedman, however, expanded the 
potential reach of exclusion for cor-
porate executives, which may have 
the effect of changing and improving 
how executives manage and oversee 
pharmaceutical companies. 
Finally, corporate executives may 
face new threats of exclusion by the 
OIG under the recently finalized reg-
ulations implementing the Physician 
Payment Sunshine Act – section 
6002 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).154 
In general, the “Sunshine Act” 
requires applicable manufacturers of 
drugs, devices, biologicals, or medical 
supplies (“AMs”) covered under 
Medicare, Medicaid or the Children’s 
Health Insurance Plan (“CHIP”) to 
report annually to the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”), in an electronic format, 
certain payments or other transfers of 
value (e.g., travel or meals) to covered 
recipients – physicians and teaching 
hospitals.155 CMS or the OIG may 
penalize AMs that fail to report pay-
ments timely, accurately or completely.156 
To ensure compliance, the Sunshine 
Act requires specified corporate 
Executives Should Think Twice Before Accepting Pleas ‘Relating to Fraud’
continued from page 7
9
Volume 25, Number 6, August 2013 The Health Lawyer
continued on page 10
executives to attest to the accuracy and 
completeness of the reported payment 
information.157 Due to the tremendous 
amount of payments that companies 
will have to track and report, errors, 
inaccuracies, and omissions are inevita-
ble and the OIG may impute these to 
the attesting officer.158 
For example, the OIG may take a 
broad interpretation of a knowing 
failure to report or correct a payment 
as a program-related crime that 
requires mandatory exclusion, given 
that CMS is implementing the Sun-
shine Act, coupled with the broad 
definition of “related to the delivery 
of a healthcare item or service” and 
the Act’s legislative history and pur-
pose to protect the integrity of 
payments made by CMS.159 Thus, an 
officer attesting to or an employee 
contributing to such inaccurate 
reporting could have committed a 
program-related crime, which could 
result in a mandatory exclusion under 
42 U.S.C. § 1327a-7(a)(1). Alterna-
tively, the OIG could consider a 
reporting violation as a failure to sup-
ply payment information,160 a failure 
to disclose required information 
regarding ownership,161 or an offense 
“relating to fraud…or other financial 
misconduct,”162 which could result in 
a permissive exclusion. If an entity is 
sanctioned for non-compliance with 
the Sunshine Act, the OIG may also 
use section 1327a-7(b)(15) to 
exclude a certifying officer who sub-
mitted the inaccurate payment 
reports and should have known that 
such reports had errors or omissions. 
Friedman’s Expansion  
of Exclusion Under the 
RCO Doctrine
The three Purdue executives 
appealed the OIG’s 20-year exclusion 
determination to an ALJ. While on 
appeal, the OIG reduced the exclusion 
to 15 years because the executives had 
assisted law enforcement authorities to 
“combat abuse of OxyContin.”163 The 
ALJ affirmed the 15-year exclusion as 
being within a “reasonable range.”164 
The executives appealed this decision 
to the DAB, which affirmed the exclu-
sion, only reducing its length to 12 
years because there was no substantial 
evidence that the misbranded Oxy-
contin had any adverse effect on 
program beneficiaries and others.165 
The Purdue executives then sought 
review in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia, which also 
upheld the exclusion.166 On appeal to 
the D.C. Circuit, the Friedman case 
presented the question of whether the 
phrase “misdemeanor relating to 
fraud” in section 1320a-7(b)(1)(A) 
refers to a (1) generic criminal offense 
– the categorical approach – or (2) to 
the facts underlying the particular 
defendant’s conviction – the circum-
stance-specific approach.167 
The categorical approach “pro-
hibits the later court from delving 
into particular facts disclosed by the 
record of conviction” and directs that 
court to “look only to the fact of con-
viction and the statutory definition of 
the prior offense,” including the ele-
ments of that offense.168 Under the 
“circumstance-specific” approach, by 
contrast, the statutory term refers to 
the particular conduct giving rise to 
the conviction, so the court “must 
look to the facts and circumstances 
underlying an offender’s conviction” 
to determine whether that conviction 
is covered by the statute.169 The 
Appellate Court reasoned that the 
text, structure, and purpose of the 
exclusion statute indicated that the 
Secretary’s circumstance-specific 
approach was proper. The Court, 
however, noted a “split in authority 
on the question whether to defer to 
an agency’s interpretation of a term 
drawn from criminal law but used in a 
statute the agency administers.”170 
The key phrase in the exclu-
sion statute the Court used to 
uphold the executives’ exclusions 
was “relating to,” which the court 
broadly defined as “stand[ing] in 
some relation; to have bearing or 
concern; to pertain; refer; to bring 
into association with or connection 
with.”171 Using this definition, the 
Court reasoned that “relating to” 
includes any criminal conduct that 
has a factual “connection with or 
reference to” fraud.172 The Court 
explained that “relating to fraud” 
modifies “misdemeanor” and that a 
“conviction” meant a particular event 
on a particular occasion and “so refers 
to a set of facts, and not to a generic 
crime.”173 Consequently, the Court 
explained that “[m]isdemeanor mis-
branding does not necessarily require 
a culpable mental state” like generic 
misdemeanors “because a conviction 
for the offense may be, and in this 
case was, predicated upon the respon-
sible corporate officer doctrine, which 
entails strict liability.”174
Pointing to the “broad scope” of 
section 1320a-7(b)(1)(A), the Court 
used three examples to support its 
position. First, the Court maintained 
that exclusion for a misdemeanor 
relating to “other financial miscon-
duct” “expressly refers to a type of 
‘conduct,’ not to a genus of criminal 
offense.”175 Therefore, the term “mis-
demeanor” refers to the “particular 
circumstances of an individual’s con-
viction, and ‘relating to’ must denote a 
factual relationship between the con-
duct underlying the misdemeanor and 
the conduct underlying a ‘fraud.’”176
Second, the Court reasoned that 
the limiting clause in section 1320a-
7(b)(1)(B) “does not pick out a 
generic class of offenses because there 
is no generic crime of defrauding a 
program other than a healthcare pro-
gram financed in whole or in part by a 
government agency.”177 As a result, 
the Court explained that the “crimi-
nal offense” must “relate to fraud” 
because it has a factual relationship to 
conduct involving a program financed 
by a government agency, committed 
on a particular occasion.
Third, the Court explained that 
the phrase “the use of funds” in sec-
tion 1320a-7(b)(2)(ii) does not refer 
to a generic offense and therefore 
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must refer to specific facts on a par-
ticular occasion. As a result, the 
Court maintained that “related to” 
in this provision denotes a factual 
connection between an “investigation 
or audit” and “the use of funds.” 
Accordingly, the Court asserted that 
“[t]he only reasonable interpretation 
is that in all three provisions the 
phrases refer to a factual relation-
ship.”178 The Court also reasoned that 
the heading of section 1320a-7(b)(1) 
(“Conviction relating to fraud”) fur-
ther supports this reading of the 
provision. 
The Court then evaluated the 
three aggravating factors that the 
OIG relied on to exclude the execu-
tives for 12 years: (1) the conduct 
underlying the convictions lasting 
more than one year, (2) the amount 
of the financial loss, and (3) the sig-
nificant adverse physical or mental 
impact upon program beneficiaries. 
First, the Court rejected the execu-
tives’ argument that there was no 
financial loss because Purdue paid 
$160 million in “restitution,” which 
the executives admitted responsibility 
for and because Purdue generated 
almost $3 billion in revenues from 
OxyContin during the time it mis-
branded the drug, much of which 
came from federal and state healthcare 
programs that would not have been 
paid for but for the misbranding.179 
Second, while the executives’ 
violations consisted solely of omis-
sions, rather than “acts,” the Court 
concluded that HHS’ interpretation 
equating the two terms when only 
“acts” are proscribed was a permissible 
one.180 Third, the Court rejected the 
executives’ argument that HHS gave 
insufficient weight to their coopera-
tion with law enforcement agencies 
because the executives did not show 
that the Secretary had abused her 
discretion.181 
The Court however, agreed with 
the executives that there was substantial 
evidence that HHS did not take into 
account the executives’ lack of “con-
scious wrongdoing” as a mitigating 
factor.182 The Court also found that 
the length of the executives’ exclusion 
was arbitrary and capricious because 
(1) every case cited by HHS involved 
a mandatory exclusion with a pre-
sumptive baseline of five years, not a 
discretionary exclusion with a pre-
sumptive baseline of three years; (2) 
every case cited involved either a fel-
ony or Medicare fraud conviction for 
which the defendant was incarcer-
ated, which was not present in this 
case; and (3) “none of the cases cited 
even concerned an exclusion under 
section 1320a-7(b)(1),” and HHS 
“had never excluded anyone for more 
than ten years” based upon a misde-
meanor; the longest was four years.183 
The Court explained that “simply 
pointing to prior cases with the same 
bottom line but arising under a differ-
ent law and involving materially 
different facts does not provide a rea-
soned explanation for the agency’s 
apparent departure from precedent.”184 
Subsequently, the Purdue execu-
tives argued that a rehearing en banc 
was justified because the “splintered 
panel” adopted a circumstance-spe-
cific approach that ignored the 
decisions of three circuits,185 which all 
held that “‘offense relating to [specified 
misconduct]’ in another exclusion stat-
ute requires a ‘categorical’ analysis 
– i.e., the elements [not the facts] of 
the conviction…must ‘relate to’ the 
specified misconduct.”186 Specifically, 
the executives argued that “exclusion 
is authorized for an offense consisting 
of a misdemeanor relating to fraud,” 
and that the “offense,” not the factual 
basis for a conviction, must “relate to” 
fraud.187 Further, the executives 
asserted that the majority’s rationale 
adopted an expansive “nexus” test 
with “no meaningful limit” that will 
have “sweeping implications for indi-
vidual liberty interests” and conflicts 
“with Supreme Court Precedent.”188 
The executives also argued that 
“by sustaining HHS’ application of its 
‘financial loss’ aggravating factor[189]…
the majority” failed to explain or 
identify any methodology HHS used 
to determine how the executives’ 
omissions caused more than $5,000 in 
financial losses or how such losses 
justify a 12-year exclusion.190 The 
executives argued that the company-
negotiated restitution had “no 
connection to actual losses”191 and Pur-
due’s revenues for OxyContin sales 
could not “substitute for a finding of 
losses under a rational methodology…
since most sales did not result from 
misbranding, which had no adverse 
effect on beneficiaries.”192 Because the 
record contained “no evidence of what 
the losses were” and HHS “did not 
articulate any comprehensible method 
to estimate the losses,” the executives 
argued that such “‘whimsical…reason-
ing’ be rejected.”193 Finally, the panel 
erred in not giving the terms “acts” and 
“omissions” “distinct meanings” when 
the “exclusion statute and HHS regula-
tions repeatedly distinguish” such 
terms.194 Accordingly, these aggravat-
ing factors were inapplicable because 
the executives “were convicted only for 
omissions,” and thus, any equation of 
these two terms was unwarranted 
because repeated distinctions make the 
language of the regulation unambiguous.195 
In response, the government 
replied that the use of a categorical 
approach for “different provisions in 
wholly unrelated statutes does not 
warrant further review.”196 The gov-
ernment maintained that section 
1320a-7(b)(1) expressly considers 
“conduct, reflecting that Congress 
cared about what Federal health care 
program participants have done rather 
than the elements of the crime with 
which they were charged.”197 In fact, 
section (b)(1) “contains no reference 
to the elements of an offense.”198 
Moreover, the government argued 
that “no generic crime of ‘financial 
misconduct’” exists and that the use 
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of “offense” and “crime” in the statute 
“encompass the underlying acts, con-
text and circumstances,” allowing 
courts to look at “the facts and cir-
cumstances underlying the offender’s 
conviction to determine if the offense 
is within the scope of the statute.199 
Further, the government maintained 
that a “circumstance-specific approach 
ensures that the Secretary can deter 
and redress” financial misconduct and 
breaches of fiduciary responsibility that 
bear on “professional competence 
[and] performance, or financial integ-
rity,” which raise questions about 
“trustworthiness and reliability.”200
The government also asserted 
that while the three circuit courts 
used a categorical approach for an 
immigration statute, “those cases do 
not govern every statute that includes 
the phrase ‘related to’” and thus, 
there is no circuit split.201 In addition, 
the government argued that the panel 
properly interpreted “relating to” as 
meaning “[to] have a connection with 
or reference to” which allows courts 
to examine the facts and conduct 
underlying the conviction. The gov-
ernment asserted further that the 
financial loss-aggravating factor only 
required a “reasonable expectation that 
the conduct would cause losses over 
$5,000,” which was demonstrated by 
the $159 million settlement and exec-
utive bonus disgorgement.202 Finally, 
the government maintained that 
exclusions based on “culpable omis-
sions” was consistent with “binding 
precedent” and was a proper interpre-
tation of the exclusion statute for the 
“regulatory purpose of predicting 
future trustworthiness based largely 
on the extent and effects” of the 
executives’ criminal behavior.203 Con-
sequently, the D.C. Circuit denied the 
executives’ petition for rehearing en 
banc without an opinion.204 
Recommendations for  
the Industry
The Friedman case, coupled with 
the OIG’s recent trend of excluding 
executives, will have significant 
repercussions for those in the health-
care industry for several reasons. First, 
the decision likely will deter corpo-
rate healthcare executives from 
agreeing to pleas under the RCO doc-
trine because doing so could lead to 
exclusion, which would effectively 
end their careers even where the 
exclusionary period is significantly 
less than 12 years. As a result, it may 
be more difficult for the government 
and corporate defendants to resolve 
these types of cases through pleas, 
which may lead to increased litigation 
and related costs. Executives, how-
ever, may still be forced to accept 
a misdemeanor plea because prose-
cutors may threaten them with 
indictments under a felony charge, 
which could result in jail time as well 
as mandatory exclusion.205 They may 
also face pressure from corporate 
boards or shareholders to “take one 
for the team.”206
Second, a plausible defense under 
the RCO doctrine is extremely diffi-
cult. The government need only prove 
that the executive had supervisory 
authority at the time the underlying 
violations took place to convict senior 
executives of an RCO offense. This 
would be easy for prosecutors “once 
the underlying violations have been 
proven or admitted to by the corpora-
tion.”207 Moreover, although Park 
created the defense of objective 
impossibility,208 such a defense is 
impractical.209 As a result, executives 
faced with this situation may want to 
“obtain advice from counsel separate 
from the company’s counsel.”210
Third, “before an organization 
pleads guilty, all counsel should scru-
tinize language in the statement of 
the offense to reduce the quantity as 
well as the quality of admissions that 
could be used against an executive” 
not only at sentencing, but also in a 
debarment or exclusion proceeding.211 
Companies that want to protect their 
executives from exclusion may want 
to refuse to agree to plea facts “sug-
gesting false, misleading or deceptive 
promotional practices by the com-
pany.”212 This is particularly important 
because a guilty plea may have col-
lateral consequences related to 
“sentencing, business decision making, 
shareholder derivative actions, and 
Directors and Officers (“D&O”) insur-
ance policies.”213 For example, U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines provide for 
multiple level enhancements for 
healthcare fraud offenses involving 
losses exceeding $1 million.214 
Additionally, counsel must inves-
tigate and advise clients about how a 
criminal charge may affect the status 
of a medical license.215 State law and 
the rules of the applicable professional 
licensing board govern licensure mat-
ters, and under such laws, offenses 
associated with healthcare fraud may 
raise issues of “moral turpitude.”216 
Accordingly, counsel should advocate 
during settlement negotiations for “the 
particular offense that best promotes 
the defendant’s chances for avoiding 
loss of licensure.”217
Fourth, publicly traded pharma-
ceutical companies must implement a 
comprehensive strategy for dealing 
with shareholders, particularly those 
with significant holdings, due to the 
potential challenges such shareholders 
may bring if corporate executives are 
implicated in criminal charges that 
may lead to exclusion. For example, in 
the case of the OIG’s proposed exclu-
sion of Forest CEO Howard Solomon, 
business magnate Carl Icahn – who 
had acquired about seven percent of 
Forest stock – nominated four directors 
to the Forest board.218 In addition, the 
union giant AFL-CIO, which also 
controls a significant number of shares 
in Forest Labs,219 called for Solomon’s 
resignation and urged shareholders to 
“withhold” their vote for him.220 
Accordingly, companies should have 
in place clear and transparent policies 
and procedures for dealing with the 
potential suspension or removal of 
board members or executives facing 
charges or exclusion to avoid further 
disruption from shareholders and 
uncertainty from investors.
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Fifth, executives may be less likely 
to plead to misdemeanors without 
assurances from the OIG as to exclu-
sion. As a result, defense counsel should 
focus on achieving a global resolution 
early in negotiations by engaging all 
government agencies involved, and if 
possible, to negotiate a waiver of exclu-
sion/debarment.221 Accordingly, counsel 
should request a decision from the OIG 
about exclusion before any individual 
or organization pleads guilty, similar to 
how corporate defendants negotiate the 
terms of their CIAs before entering 
criminal pleas or civil settlements. 
“This request should be made even 
when an investigation is closed without 
a guilty plea because the OIG’s author-
ity to seek permissive exclusion does 
not require a criminal conviction.”222 
The OIG likely will “resist the request 
for an advance decision about exclusion 
by claiming that it cannot exercise its 
discretion until after the resolution of 
criminal and civil matters.”223 
This argument, however, is prob-
lematic because the OIG makes 
decisions about exclusions for com-
panies before such cases are resolved 
by knowing enough about the inves-
tigation to accept the terms of the 
CIA. Moreover, the case of Michael 
Dinkel is precedent that the OIG 
will make a decision about exclusion 
before accepting a settlement.224 
Additionally, defense counsel may 
“argue that a timely decision about 
exclusion is a matter of due process 
because the parties need to evaluate the 
true impact of a proposed agreement 
with the government.”225 If the OIG 
continues to refuse, defense counsel 
should negotiate a way to limit “the 
number of individuals or the types of 
positions that might be considered for 
permissive exclusion,” and should ask 
the OIG to render exclusion decisions 
“within a certain period of time so that 
the organization and the individuals 
can plan their futures accordingly.”226
Sixth, individuals and companies 
must proactively avoid debarment by 
the FDA, which requires the agency 
to refuse accepting any drug applica-
tions from the individual or entity.227 
For the most part, an FDA debarment 
has effects similar to exclusion in that 
a debarred individual cannot assist or 
provide services (either indirectly or 
through employment) “in any capac-
ity”228 for a company that has an 
approved or pending drug application 
with the FDA.229 The mandatory pro-
visions direct the FDA to debar an 
individual who has received a felony 
conviction for misconduct relating to 
the development, approval, or regula-
tion of a drug.230 The regulations also 
give the FDA the discretion to per-
missively debar an individual for up 
to five years for receiving a federal 
misdemeanor or state felony convic-
tion for conduct relating to the 
development, approval, or regulation 
of drug products, or if such individual 
has been convicted of a felony unre-
lated to regulation of drugs that 
involves certain crimes.231 The FDA 
may consider several factors in deter-
mining debarment length.232 As there 
may be increased risk for debarment 
given the FDA’s recent reforms that 
have improved the “quantity, effi-
ciency, and transparency of its 
debarment actions,”233 counsel should 
negotiate to avoid such actions.
Seventh, Lauren Stevens’ experi-
ence offers several important factors 
for in-house and outside counsel and 
drug companies to consider moving 
forward given the increased potential 
use of the RCO doctrine. Specifically, 
companies and counsel should (1) 
work closely with a multi-disciplinary 
team of attorneys who understand the 
government entity with which they 
are dealing; (2) encourage company 
counsel to carefully consider whether 
outside counsel should sign any sub-
missions to government agencies; 
(3) keep dialogue and tone with 
government civil; (4) draft any writ-
ten product – particularly those being 
submitted to the government – with 
an eye toward how a criminal investi-
gator would interpret the writing with 
full benefit of hindsight;234 (5) engage 
outside counsel early on in an investi-
gation to take advantage of the 
attorney-client privilege and advice 
of counsel defense; (6) make clear to 
government officials from the outset 
that the company will be relying on 
advice of outside counsel; (7) create a 
paper trail that documents the inves-
tigation process followed by in-house 
counsel at the advice of or in coordi-
nation with outside counsel;235 and 
(8) “thoroughly document not only 
identified problems, but also the 
responses to those problems.”236
Additionally, although it may be 
difficult for other companies to apply 
the Stryker Biotech case to their own 
situation because of the unique fac-
tual circumstances, several problems 
the government faced in that case 
may be useful for counsel to consider. 
To the extent facts or evidence allow 
such arguments, counsel should look 
for opportunities to (1) emphasize the 
highly technical nature or skilled 
training requirements of a product 
that make a company’s influence over 
an individual difficult to prove; (2) 
demonstrate the safety of a product 
through adverse event reporting and 
detailed analysis of whether such 
reports are minor; (3) show that rela-
tionships between sales representatives 
and physicians are long-term; and (4) 
point to market competition and 
undermine notions of maximizing 
short-term sales.237
Finally, to determine particular 
risk exposure, companies should iden-
tify high-risk policies, practices, and 
business lines as part of a comprehen-
sive risk management and mitigation 
program – requirements that many 
CIAs already include. There should 
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also be a procedure to “establish a 
rapid response team to immediately 
assess and contain any compliance 
failure, as well as to escalate, resolve, 
and self-report those failures as war-
ranted.”238 When such failure has 
been identified and remedial measures 
established, a “business-line supervi-
sor should be designated (and the 
designation documented) to monitor 
implementation and provide periodic 
reports to the legal/compliance func-
tion.”239 Moreover, companies should 
establish policies and procedures for 
“creating a comprehensive record of 
corrective actions taken in response 
to compliance incidents and which 
senior personnel” take such actions.240 
Companies should also establish 
a system for periodic audits to identify 
variations from company policies and 
procedures and to determine, based 
on audit findings, when such policies 
and procedures “should be re-assessed 
and personnel should be re-trained for 
compliance.”241 Further, companies 
should consider requiring relevant 
employees, officers, and executives to 
“annually re-certify their understand-
ing of and compliance with the 
relevant policies and procedures.”242 
This is particularly important given 
that OIG Chief Counsel Gregory Dem-
ske recently emphasized that effective 
healthcare boards are “active,” “raise 
questions,” “stay informed on risk 
areas,” “learn of all significant compli-
ance issues,” and “attend compliance 
training and speak to staff about com-
pliance.”243 Companies may even want 
to pursue RCO insurance policies to 
“mitigate the economic loss of an RCO 
prosecution or debarment.”244 Finally, 
executives and employees responsible 
for transparency and payment reporting 
must exercise due diligence and estab-
lish explicit checks and balances at 
every level of data collection to reduce 
potential individual liability.245
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Friedman case 
underscores “the government’s 
expectation that upper management be 
actively involved in ensuring corporate 
compliance with federal healthcare 
laws and regulations.”246 Two factors in 
the OIG’s guidance on permissive 
exclusion – the individual’s role and 
response to the misconduct – demand 
that corporate executives become 
integrally involved in their company’s 
compliance efforts to ensure that 
affirmative steps are being taken to 
minimize the risk of misconduct. More-
over, the recently amended Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organiza-
tions emphasize the use of corporate 
compliance programs to facilitate 
corporate transformation.247 Six phar-
maceutical companies have already 
developed a “set of principles on the 
recoupment of executive incentive 
compensation in the event of corpo-
rate compliance or other violations.”248
Now that the OIG has strong 
precedent in both federal  and 
administrative court upholding 
executives’ exclusions, coupled with 
the FDA, the DOJ, and the OIG’s 
recent emphasis on changing corpo-
rate behavior through the RCO 
doctrine, healthcare executives face 
new and real challenges. The Fried-
m a n  a n d  o t h e r  R C O  c a s e s 
demonstrate that a guilty plea could 
potentially result in exclusion, 
despite a lack of personal involve-
ment in or even awareness of the 
alleged misconduct, if there is a fac-
tual connection relating to fraud. 
Accordingly, healthcare stake-
holders will need “to work proactively 
with the OIG prior to accepting a 
guilty plea to better assess whether an 
exclusion proceeding may occur subse-
quent to conviction.”249 Additionally, 
companies will need to design, 
develop, enhance, and implement 
robust compliance initiatives based 
on the factors outlined in the OIG’s 
latest guidance on permissive exclu-
sion, and the fact patterns underlying 
recent RCO prosecutions, to mini-
mize RCO liability of companies and 
their executives, officers, and in-
house counsel. 
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